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ON THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR CODETERMINATION LAW
*Stephen C. Smith 
April 1990
Abstract
This paper develops a positive economic case for codetermina­
tion law resting on the correction of labor and capital market and 
organizational failures. A legally mandated codetermination struc­
ture is shown to provide employee "checks" on several structural 
incentives for management opportunism. Codetermination is shown to 
offer advantages for technical efficiency and knowledge generation 
through its protection of specific human capital investments. Fin­
ancial markets cannot enforce codetermination due to a set of free 
rider problems.
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Public policies aimed at requiring managers to share authority 
with employees have been introduced in many countries in recent 
years. The term codetermination (CD) denotes employee 
participation in decision-making on the board of directors as 
well as in the immediate workplace. West Germany is the largest 
economy in which employees have the legal right to such 
participation; "codetermination" is a literal translation of the 
German Mitbestimmuna. which carries this dual workplace-board 
connotation also implied in the paper unless stated otherwise.
German CD laws are complex, have been revised several times, 
and include the following features. Half of the board members of 
large firms (over 2000 employees) and one-third in medium size 
firms (500-2000 employees) are elected by employees (indirectly 
through a kind of electoral college), while stockholders usually 
appoint the tiebreaking chairman in large firms. In addition, 
workers in firms with more than 5 employees have the right to ask 
for management-employee works councils to arbitrate most aspects 
of workplace decision making.
Denmark, Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have 
full CD laws while Italy and most of the remaining West European 
countries (excepting Britain) mandate councils for employee 
participation at the workplace, though not on the board. In 
France, employees also send non-voting representatives to the 
board (for details see Summers (1980, 1982), Kuhne (1980), Aoki 
(1984), Kolvenbach (1978, 1982), Carby-Hall (1977), and IDE 
(1981)). In each case, managers retain day-to-day authority to 




























































































Thus CD provides what Americans term "checks and balances." More 
precisely, it is an example of what Arrow (1974, p.77) calls a 
"responsibility mechanism."
The potential benefits of CD are widely discussed in the 
economic (and more broadly social science) literature. 
Theoretical and empirical pieces have argued that workplace and 
or board participation provides productivity enhancement (Cable 
and Fitzroy, 1980; Witte, 1981); benefits the industrial 
relations climate (Bradley and Gelb, 1983); accelerates technical 
innovation (Vanek, 1971); allows more efficient provision of 
workplace characteristics (Dreze, 1976); expands skills in 
democratic processes and participation in community affairs 
(Pateman, 1970; Dahl, 1985); protects against arbitrary use and 
abuse of authority when firm-specific skills prevent labor 
mobility (Putterman, 1982; Dow, 1987); raises output quality 
(Freund and Epstein, 1984; Streeck, 1984); reduces "workers' 
exposure to risks outside their control" (Nuti, 1988, p.180); and 
promotes personal self-esteem and fulfillment among employees 
(e.g., IDE, 1982).
But it is one thing to state reasonable hypotheses about 
effects of CD, and even to present statistical evidence in 
support of these links. It is another thing to conclude that the 
extent of these contracts and management practices, at least 
given enough time for firms to adjust, is "too limited" from a 
positive economics point of view (Furubotn, 1985). It has been 
argued that if the benefits of CD are internal to the firm, 
economic selection pressures in either labor or output markets 




























































































and management; this in turn would lead to the bankruptcy of 
existing firms failing to adapt to the superior organizational 
form (Jensen and Meckling, 1979).
Further, adjustment costs may slow the adoption of an 
economically viable innovation that the market will ultimately 
adopt in full. Diffusion of productive technology (including 
organization itself) of course takes time. It should not be 
surprising that the management journals feature numerous articles 
trumpeting the benefits of "employee involvement," "participative 
management," "quality circles," "work councils" and other closely 
related ideas. This itself may be seen as part of the diffusion 
process. Managers pay for these journals precisely to learn how 
to better manage in a changing economy. But there are certain 
structural limitations on the extent of this diffusion process.
This paper considers whether there is a (positive rather than 
only normative) economic case for some form of CD legislation. In 
doing so features of specific laws (involving for example unions 
or dual board levels) are abstracted from to focus on a general 
economic analysis, on the basis of which specific laws could be 
evaluated. Thus the following key questions are addressed: 1. 
Might CD of some type have come about on its own as a result of 
market forces? 2. What is the effect of legal requirements? 3. 
Most fundamentally, might market and or organizational failures 




























































































2. CD Laws Provide Employee "Checks" on Structural Incentives for 
Management Opportunism,
The authority held by management to organize the workplace 
unilaterally has efficiency implications if it distorts the 
organization of work. In this section, five incentives for 
managers to distort the organizational structure and other 
decisions away from efficiency are introduced. The potential for 
CD to correct these distortions is developed.
The relationships between remuneration schemes, internal 
organization including the need for various kinds of supervision, 
the de facto objective(s) of the firm, and any "organizational 
failures" (Williamson, 1975) are extremely complex (Putterman, 
1982, 1984, 1987) . It is not adequate to state an individual or 
joint maximand and study the resulting first order conditions,2 
since objectives, compensation schemes and firm organization are 
jointly determined and quantitative changes in one of these sets 
of variables may induce qualitative changes in the others. To 
make an analysis tractable, however, it will be assumed that the 
basic productive task of the enterprise, and the job descriptions 
of the individual employees (such as to produce quality cars or 
serve the requirements of clients) will not vary with the 
relative influence of employees in decision-making. Of course, 
managers, owners and employees may have significantly different 
interests in the firm; this is what leads effort, broadly 
construed, to vary according to the reward structure and the 





























































































As Herbert Simon (1976) has stressed, accepting an offer of 
employment implies an acceptance of authority, albeit for a 
limited domain. In a modern corporation, few employees receive 
instructions directly from a company owner. Instead, they are 
directed by a manager. Although the exact degree of managerial 
autonomy continues to be disputed, it is clear that managers are 
in turn answerable to the ultimate owners (private or public) 
only in a general way (Brudney, 1985). Sufficient specific human 
capital idiosyncracy ensures that this authority is qualitatively 
different from what is observed in other market relationships.
Most employees make investments in the organization that 
employs them. Some will buy shares of stock but most such 
investments are in the form of specific human capital, or in 
acquiring knowledge, skills, and even "corporate culture" (Deal 
and Kennedy, 1982) which increases their productive value to that 
organization (but not to other organizations) . Employees expect 
to be rewarded in exchange for making such investments, whether 
this is an explicit agreement or an "implicit contract." Human 
capital investment contracts may need to be enforced; the legal 
system in virtually all Western countries recognizes certain 
rights of employees at least as "affected bystanders"; and 
moreover, treats the corporation as having responsibilities which 
extend to the community and the environment as well as employees 
(for the U.S. case see Summers, 1980, 1982).
It is impractical for employees to quit each time they are 
asked to do something outside the scope of managerial authority 
or rewards or promotions are allocated on the basis of criteria 




























































































opportunity costs of job hunting, employees who feel they are not 
paid what they are worth may stick with the job knowing they can 
not do better elsewhere. This is because part of what establishes 
their economic value in their current workplace is their years of 
experience building skills and abilities of special value to that 
firm. And employees who know they could do a better job if they 
were running their own company often do not exit, for example 
because of hesitance to take on risk or the presence of various 
barriers to entry.
The organizational failure problem has probably been stated 
most succinctly by Dow (1987, p.21-22):
A recognition that opportunistic behavior can crop up on both 
sides of the authority relationship...(involves more) than just 
an awareness that employers and employees alike suffer from the 
moral flaws of 'human nature as we know it.' The deeper 
difficulty is that authority relations generate the structural 
preconditions under which employer opportunism is most likely to 
be encouraged; namely, information impactedness, small numbers, 
and availability of a tool (decision by fiat) which is tailor- 
made for unilateral pursuit of self-interest...what is needed to 
limit opportunism by authorities is reciprocal monitoring by 
subordinates and a capacity to impose sanctions when abuses are 
detected.
Building on such recent developments in economic organization 
theory, we proceed to offer five incentives for management to 
distort the organization of work away from efficiency, and the 
potentially offsetting role of codetermination.
a. Opportunistic credit-taking. Management has a strong 
incentive to make it appear that innovative ideas originate with 
the managers rather than their employees; and that they are 
otherwise more productive than their subordinates. This 
impression justifies high salary as well as promotions. The 




























































































most modern corporations of some size, long-term rewards for 
furthering enterprise goals are more frequently expressed through 
the promotion than the salary raise within the current position.3 
The ability of managers to create the impression that they are 
more often the source of productivity and innovation will depend 
on the organization of the workplace. In making such choices, 
managers have an incentive to consider their own private benefits 
and costs rather than those of the enterprise as a whole. 
Considerable distortions will be possible before the manager's 
private costs resulting from any overall damage to the firm equal 
or exceed his private benefits from a more efficient 
organization, which might, among other things, credit him less 
for its successes. In the extreme, managers may even have an 
incentive to create a workplace setting in which employees have 
no opportunity to put forward innovative ideas and no or even 
negative incentive to take any number of other productivity­
enhancing actions. Since the same set of incentives hold for all 
managers, the owners of the firm may be able to do little about 
the problem merely by dismissing management (Dow, 1987, p.24), 
and in any case micro-monitoring of managers by shareholders is 
impractical (Coffee, 1986).
The results of such a distorted organizational structure may 
include reduced incentive for employees to develop and put. 
forward innovative ideas; and false information (or "signals") to 
higher authorities about the distribution of abilities in the 
organization. CD provides employees with a regular grievance 
channel to either higher level managers or to owners; even if not 




























































































b. Time horizon opportunism. In many countries, management 
careers typically involve working sequentially for a number of 
companies. Further, senior executives tend to be relatively close 
to retirement age. The time horizon of capital markets is 
controversial but arguably indefinite. But the time horizon of 
management (the presumed agent of capital) is much shorter. 
Managers' rewards will be based on perceived performance during 
their tenure. This is a major reason why senior executives are 
remunerated partly through stock options; but the role of shares 
in rooting out management opportunism is limited by management 
risk aversion and the highly imperfect connection between 
particular managers' performance and share values (influenced 
both by other managers and exogenous shocks).
The average age of nonmanagerial employees is lower than that 
of management, and in many cases their median expected stay with 
the company is longer. One valuable "balance" that CD can offer 
is to reduce management time horizon opportunism.4 Managerial 
actions taken with a short term view to increase management 
rewards at the expense of the long run viability of the company 
would be opposed by shareholders and employee board 
representatives alike, if the information known to employees were 
available to the board. For such actions violate implicit labor 
contracts as well as the trust of shareholders. By the time that 
information on the ability or actions of top management becomes 
clear to the market in the absence of CD penalties for management 
may be otherwise outweighed by private benefits of their 
opportunistic behavior. Presumably, knowledge of these structural 




























































































investments as well as employees' willingness to make specific 
human capital investments.
c. Information flow opportunism. Management has an incentive 
to provide a less than optimal flow of information, among 
employees and between owners and employees, for example. Since 
bargaining power is generally correlated with information, 
centralization of information, without access to it when 
necessary, can lead to its hoarding and misuse.
This represents a potentially serious deviation from what 
might be a first-best outcome, at least from a strictly 
productive efficiency point of view, of unchecked hierarchy: "It 
is cheaper and more efficient to transmit all the pieces of 
information once to a central place than to disseminate each of 
them to everyone... it may be cheaper for a central individual or 
office to make the collective decision and transmit it rather 
than retransmit all the information on which the decision is 
based" (Arrow, 1974, p.68).
On the other hand Aoki (1984, ch.10) stresses that CD plays a 
role in ensuring that "managerial information" is received by 
employees, "an undoubted prerequisite for the approximation of 
organizational equilibrium (cooperative solution) within the 
firm." Williamson (1985, pp. 302-304) points out that the 
availability of "credible" information that CD can provide is 
especially critical "during periods of actual or alleged 
adversity" and speculates that "the informational benefits of 
labor membership (on the board of directors) are not adequately 
appreciated." These arguments are not mutually inconsistent 




























































































Aoki's a second best world which allows for the potential of 
organizational failure.5
Efficiency within the enterprise may be characterized as a 
cooperative game solution among suppliers of the factors of 
production (Sertel, 1982; Aoki, 1980, 1984; Svejnar, 1982). The 
(at least partial) shift from a noncooperative to a cooperative 
mode links CD with higher productivity (Aoki, 1984; Fitzroy and 
Kraft, 1987). Centralization of information and decision-making 
will not be efficient if the firm slips into noncooperation as a 
result. This danger is certainly present when employees realize 
that managers have the incentive and the means to behave 
opportunistically.
Tests of the quality of management decisions are of a 
different nature than tests of product quality, since product 
markets involves no authority relations, but the labor market 
does; and because of the frequently long time lag between 
management decisions and the imperfect measurement of the market 
reaction to them. A good example of the problem is the common 
failure of bank managers to write off bad loans in a timely and 
prudent manner.6 This decision often becomes apparent only after 
their tenure, and moreover this represents opportunism toward 
employees as well as shareholders if it affects the future of 
investments in firm specific human capital (if layoffs, wage cuts 
or bankruptcy result).
CD carries risks of informational inefficiency. But in a 
second-best world in which agents may (be perceived to) have the 
incentive to behave opportunistically, the more sluggish 




























































































result by offering an internal quality control mechanism over 
management decisions.7 The firm may not introduce it voluntarily 
because CD is costly to individual managers, who make decisions 
about internal organization. Although managers may benefit from 
ensuring that employees receive credible information, they may 
fear that other functions of CD, including quality control over 
management decisions, represent a threat to their jobs. Their 
private risk/reward assessment may lead them to resist CD. Even 
with a single labor representative on the board, as with the case 
of Chrysler, board membership may provide a forum for employees 
to raise issues of managerial incompetence or shirking. Indeed, 
board membership is a two-way information channel; the reverse 
channel may be the one management is worried about. Thus, the 
presence of even non-voting employee board members deprived of 
full information could lead to improved efficiency.
Unchecked hierarchy systems suffer from a number of 
disincentives for innovation and specific training. A common 
employee complaint of management opportunism is that management 
takes credit for employee innovations. If the two-way 
communication channels of CD were effective, employees could be 
more confident that they would reap the rewards (raises, bonuses, 
promotions, etc.) for their innovations (Smith, 1988). Thus, 
participation in profits and decision-making are strongly linked 
(Méade, 1988; Nuti, 1988).
A related complaint is that employees are often "forced to 
train their bosses," who may be a management trainee or recent 
transfer. If the employees are effective, the manager may be 




























































































against pointing out the subordinates responsible for his 
success. The employees remain confined to nonmanagerial status. 
The circumstances may lead employees to withhold information from 
their supervisors; CD might reasonably lessen the impact of such 
organization failures.
The fundamental issue is again raised by Dow (1987, p. 24): 
"who monitors those in positions of authority, in order to ensure 
that their self-interest does not threaten collective interests?" 
In the presence of firm-specific human capital and other 
transaction costs exit or its threat is insufficient. Dow 
concludes that "the unaided market cannot accomplish" the 
creation of managerial monitoring by employees "in part because 
asset idiosyncrasy is often substantial on both sides of the 
authority relationship, and in part because the relevant 
information is unlikely to pass easily across organizational 
boundaries (Teece, 1982), thus disabling reputational protections 
which might emerge via the managerial labor market."
In summary, unchecked hierarchy might be a first-best solution 
from the point of view of informational efficiency if not for two 
distinct problems: (a) managers are fallible and (b) managers 
have an incentive to behave opportunistically. Indeed, their 
fallibility increases their incentive to organize the firm and 
treat information opportunistically. In the presence of these 
market and organizational failures, CD emerges as a second-best 
solution. CD cannot solve the "information revelation problem." 
Employees and owners, as well as managers, have incentives to 
withhold certain information. But CD is likely to reduce these 




























































































perceptive participants where other information is being 
distorted or withheld.
d. Authority-hoarding opportunism. In part because of the 
incentive to create opportunities for management opportunism, and 
in part the direct managerial utility from authority, CD is a 
preferred "workplace characteristic" in systematic undersupply, 
adding to the firm's compensation costs (by convexity of 
preferences). A relevant result from general equilibrium analysis 
(Dreze and Hagen, 1978) is that "competitive profit maximization 
does not imply an efficient choice of working conditions." In 
this light, CD might lead to a more efficient allocation of job 
characteristics; indeed, Dreze (1976, p.1130) argues that "labor 
control over working conditions seems to offer a natural remedy." 
However, with the exception of CD characteristics, the public 
goods problem pointed up by Dreze and Hagen might be tackled by 
some device other than legislated CD.8 In the course of the
detailed argument, an appeal to epidemiological and survey data 
as preliminary empirical evidence is offered. Surveys show that 
in the United States, a country without CD laws, CD is favored by 
most employees (though these surveys did not ask what employees 
would give up in exchange for such participation) . A US Chamber 
of Commerce-commissioned poll found that 84% of the American 
workforce would like the chance to participate in management 
decisions, while a survey by Peter Hart Associates showed that 
two-thirds of Americans would prefer to work in a participatory 
environment (Jones 1987, p.493).
Moreover, the incidence of stress has been found to be highest 




























































































jobs, other things held constant. This stress has definite 
medical consequences; a recent study showed that men whose jobs 
combine high psychological demands with little control over their 
work face heart attack risk twice to three times as great as 
other male workers (Karasek, et al, 1988) . Stressful occupations 
included those of cooks, waiters, computer operators, gas station 
attendants and assembly line workers who had to work quickly and 
face heavy workloads with little control over one's work to "deal 
satisfactorily with its psychological demands." In contrast, 
executive and professional jobs are not considered high stress by 
these studies because they allow considerable control over ones' 
work. The market may be particularly unable to communicate 
employee preferences over job characteristics (such as stress) 
when they overlap with the characteristic of participation. Why 
might this workplace characteristic be systematically under­
supplied?
Surveys of entrepreneurs indicate that they are motivated at 
least as much by the goal of controlling an organization as they 
are in financial rewards (Ronen, 1983).s This helps to explain 
why, when there is entry, it is not more often by codetermined 
firms (that is, in countries without CD laws) . It might not be 
worth even a considerable sum to some entrepreneurs to alter 
their managerial style. As an illustrative model, suppose 
entrepreneurs maximize utility over income and control subject to 
a transformation locus in which in the relevant range with more 
control on the part of the entrepreneur, there is also less 
profitability (because he always "insists on doing things 'his 




























































































"participatory" than that consistent with maximum static 
efficiency (Steinherr, 1977).
It is a cliche that entrepreneurs create firms but cannot 
manage them; it is natural to assume that decision-making 
hoarding is just another manifestation of the problem. But Klein 
(1984) found that even first-line supervisors are strongly 
resistant to "employee involvement" programs. As she summarizes 
her surveys, "most revealing, perhaps, is the finding that 
although nearly three-quarters (72%) of the supervisors view 
these programs as being good for their companies and more than 
half (60%) see them as good for employees, less than a third 
(31%) view them as beneficial to themselves." Among other causes, 
Klein's surveys point to supervisors' fear of loss of status and 
power in the workplace. In general, the corporate ladder-climber 
may be just as motivated by the desire for authority as the 
entrepreneur (see also Frank, 1985, pp. 136-42; 180) . And as 
Herbert Simon has put it (1976, p.268), "desire for power and 
concern for personal advancement represent an intrusion of 
personal goals upon organizational role."
This argument alone does not prove that efficiency would be 
raised by CD laws. Entrepreneurs might consider starting a firm 
simply not worth the effort; and with reduced entrepreneurship 
the ultimate social welfare cost in output of goods and services 
might be greater than that caused by opportunism and its 
consequences. It is worthwhile to distinguish between "once for 
all time" gains from CD due to reallocation of existing resources 
(static effects) and gains or losses associated with changes in 




























































































Elsewhere we encountered the potential loss of employee- 
contributed innovations due to the lack of CD. The "entrepreneurs 
as control-seekers" model raises a potential dynamic cost of CD. 
A policy of (perhaps partial) exemption from CD laws for a few 
years for entrepreneurial startups might offer one solution. In 
any case, any disadvantage individual codetermined firms might 
face in competing for entrepreneurial talent would be limited if 
CD were legislated for all firms (Putterman, 1982, p.157).
e. Second-level effects on investment and efficiency. All of 
the above incentives for management opportunism may adversely 
affect employee behavior, leading directly or indirectly to 
increased monitoring costs and expansion of management 
responsibilities into inefficient domains. Additional 
organizational distortions follow from management's need to 
respond to the collapse of cooperation that (potential or actual) 
opportunism or lack of quality control on decisions may cause. 
Employees know managers may respond opportunistically to their 
contributions to the firm (such as by taking credit for these 
contributions) ; thus, employees may lower their expectations of 
their ultimate personal reward for their efforts. This will force 
management to expend more scarce resources on monitoring, and on 
taking over certain creative responsibilities for which the 
comparative advantage may rest with those closely involved in the 
work. Among other things, this provides an incentive to create 
excess layers of management.10
As the analysis of Hashimoto (1981) implies, even the distrust 
of management due to its incentive and means "to appropriate a 




























































































is firm-specific may lead to inefficient allocation. Under­
investment in firm specific human capital is only one such 
effect; underinvestment in complementary firm specific physical 
capital will follow, even if shareholders do not similarly fear 
management appropriation of their own share. Employee fear that 
management will unilaterally introduce technological changes 
which have the effect of undercutting labor's bargaining position 
can lead to underinvestment in specific human capital (Dow, 
1985) . The legal protection of CD, by ensuring that management 
will not renege on agreements with employees, increases employee 
confidence in their investments in the firm. It would be 
difficult to achieve this employee confidence without such legal 
intervention (see also Streeck, 1984, p.417).
Investments in securities are protected by law and regulation. 
The benefits of doing so for the supply of capital are well 
understood. If human capital investment were subject to 
"disclosure" requirements and a viable employee check on 
management opportunism, its supply might also be expanded. CD 
laws would help to ensure these attributes within the firm, 
without resort to direct regulation by government agencies who 
will be less well informed about workplace conditions. This would 
in turn allow employees to take a more long term view of the 
firm's interests, decreasing their incentive to opportunistically 
seek out short run benefits. The transaction costs for an 
individual company to set up credible guarantees without an 
overall legal framework may simply be too high (by analogy 
consider the lower value of voluntary disclosure of financial 




























































































All forms of wealth are generally subject to some legal 
protection; specific human capital is a form of social wealth. 
Managers also gain from the legal protection of specific human 
capital investments (Coffee, 1986); this effect would appear to 
complement gains from lowered management shirking and resource 
diversion. Mandated CD would not eliminate conflicts of 
protection of financial and specific human capital. But it might 
be a cost-effective way to expand the protection of wealth, and 
thereby expand an important type of investment, without recourse 
to the courtroom. Thus CD could conserve resources otherwise 
devoted to litigation (as is apparently the case for plant 
closing and rationalization conflicts in West Germany11).
CD is an investment in maintaining internal cooperative 
solutions. It is difficult to maintain a cooperative solution 
within firms, as it is among members of a cartel. A continued 
cooperative solution requires perceived incentives not to depart 
from the cooperative solution. Organizational investments in 
ensuring a cooperative game outcome would appear often justified. 
But perceived incentives for cooperation may require improved 
information flows and other threats to management opportunities 
for opportunism (an organizational failure). Like investments in 
innovation, from the social viewpoint the market is likely to 
undersupply investments in internal cooperative solutions.
Management has an incentive to create an organization capable 
of hiding its opportunistic behavior and error. Costs of 
management opportunism including theft of perks, lowered 




























































































may be compounded by the costs of operating an organizational 
structure capable of hiding such abuses.
3. Financial markets cannot enforce CD due to free rider problems
The private external benefits of unchecked hierarchy are 
concentrated in a few managers, while the private external costs 
are widely scattered among many employees. Each employee has 
individually relatively little to gain from CD, and each manager 
has relatively much to lose. Thus pressure to maintain the status 
quo will be strong. But if the external benefits and costs of CD 
could somehow be aggregated, it might leave both employees and 
shareholders better off.
Capital markets face a set of similar problems. Any one 
shareholder will find very limited private value in trying to 
influence management or trying to organize all shareholders to do 
so. Takeovers are costly and risky, and so likely to be effective 
only in extreme circumstances. And the normal pattern for boards 
of directors (generally comprised of managers from the company or 
other companies) is to go out of their way to maintain cordial 
relations with management. Although hostile takeovers in search 
of corporations' break-up value emerged in the US in the 1980s, 
law review articles, courts and the SEC are recognizing numerous 
harmful effects (inter alia to employees with firm specific human 
capital). The future of this type of takeover activity, which had 
slowed dramatically by the end of the decade, is much in doubt. 
Further, as Brudney (1985, p.1423) concludes, there are 
fundamental limitations
on the stockholder's power to choose or police the terms on which 
management functions or holds office if that choice can only be 
embodied in the decision to buy or sell corporate stock... it is 
doubtful that the market can incorporate in stock prices any 




























































































limiting managerial discretion. Hence the price cannot properly 
reflect stockholder preferences with respect to the appropriate 
scope of managerial discretion and the concomitant potential for 
diversion of assets and for operating inefficiently.
The applicability of "nexus of contract" theories (Fama and
Jensen, 1983) in this context is thus also fundamentally limited.
Shareholders benefit from CD, on the other hand, because 
employee board members are able to ask informed questions which 
require management to defend any questionable actions on a 
regular basis. Shareholders in any one firm are too diffuse to 
successfully insist on CD in the face of entrenched management 
opposition. Shareholders might oppose CD for other reasons, such 
as a fear of losing bargaining power in an adversarial industrial 
relations climate. Of course, capital and labor have partially 
divergent interests in the firm, but the link between CD and an 
internal cooperative solution is a new idea, probably not well 
understood by the shareholding public.
Beyond this, the takeover is a very unlikely device for 
ensuring that CD is introduced when it is economically efficient. 
It is difficult for outsiders to learn the details of internal 
organization and opportunism. Moreover, a corporate raider would 
have a hard time finding a management team committed to making CD 
work in an economy in which it was not the norm. Even if not for 
problems of opportunism, there are few managers with such skills 
in a noncodetermined economy. Training managers in such skills is 
unlikely to be profitable because of pecuniary externalities of 
the type stressed in the development literature (see Rosenstein-
Rodan, 1943) . And unless all (or most) firms introduce CD,
management's aversion to it may make it impractical and




























































































problems could be overcome, capital markets would have to be 
convinced to back such an approach. Putterman (1982, p.158) 
concludes that "if equity owners value their voting control over 
firm policies...the introduction of any degree of codetermination 
in a firm previously controlled entirely by capital would produce 
a... reduction in equity value." This too would make it more 
costly for the firm to raise capital. But a legal requirement for 
all firms to introduce CD minimizes such costs. As CD continues 
to expand internationally, such capital cost effects should 
continue to shrink. In any case, there is little empirical 
evidence that small equity holders value voting control as such.
Even allowing the arguments that decision-making and risk­
bearing should ceteris paribus be associated, and recalling the 
natural link between codetermination and gainsharing, if 
participation in decision-making becomes limited to those who are 
in a position to take on significant risk, there will be 
efficiency costs. For if decision skills and place in the 
internal organization are not the key criteria for selecting 
decision-making participators, but rather personal wealth or some 
other factor associated with the ability to bear risk, then some 
of the organization's assets are being systematically 
underutilized and underdeveloped.12 There is no a priori reason 
to suppose that CD would lower the incentives for financial 
investment. To the extent management opportunism is curtailed, a 
cooperative solution encouraged and employee investments 
expanded, productivity may be expected to rise.
But the extent to which efficiencies due to CD would flow to 




























































































distributionally neutral. Indeed, for the market to accomplish a 
switch to CD under these circumstances, a mechanism for 
sidepayments might have to be found. Free rider and collective 
action problems throw this into doubt. It is beyond the scope of 
the present study to fully evaluate the distributional 
implications of CD. Certainly the normative, public benefit 
arguments upon which CD law has been built in Europe expects some 
uncompensated transfer of utility to employees, more or less like 
a progressive tax (Gotthold, 1987).
But one plausible outcome of CD is that shareholders and 
employees may gain utility while managers lose utility due to the 
curtailment of management opportunism. This may be compared to 
the loss of monopoly rents when a natural monopoly is regulated. 
Management opportunism does not result from voluntary exchange in 
competitive markets. Thus one need not appeal to the social 
desirability of "utility redistribution" to support this 
transfer. Indeed, dynamic efficiency should be enhanced if 
increases in specific human capital investment (along with 
decreased management shirking and resource diversion) follow. 
Specific human capital intensity of production appears to grow 
secularly in the course of economic development (Smith, 1988), 
increasing the economic benefits of CD and, to the extent market 
and organizational failures prevent its timely adoption, making 
the case for CD law greater as development proceeds. But if the 
criteria is that no party otherwise be made worse off in utility 
terms, some one-time transfer to initial managers and (perhaps) 




























































































But overall, shareholders clearly gain by enforcing a 
mechanism by which managers must account for their actions on a 
regular basis by those in an excellent position to ask pointed 
questions, and CD seems to provide such a mechanism.
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications
A positive economic case for CD resting on market and 
organizational failures has been presented, independent of 
normative economic, legal and social arguments on which the laws 
have rested to this point. Weights have not been placed on the 
various failures; continued empirical study is thus important. 
Arguments for CD laws in cases where specific human capital is 
not present were not advanced, but the human capital intensivity 
of production has historically grown and is widely viewed as 
becoming dramatically more important in the current period. There 
is always the question: can government improve on the results of 
market failure with policy? There is always a fear that final 
legislation may bear little relation to the economic analysis on 
which it is based. Although CD laws may reduce both employee and 
management opportunism, there is the two-fold danger that CD laws 
will be too weak in certain respects to be effective in checking 
management opportunism on the one hand, and too strong in other 
respects so as to have negative effects on employee incentives. 
The market failures examined in this paper are not easy to 
correct. Great care must be taken in drafting CD legislation. 
This paper has not concerned itself with specific CD laws, but 
only with general principles; in particular, we have largely 




























































































board CD and the explicit role of unions observed in a number of 
cases. But CD laws, like other laws of contracting, do not have 
to yield a Pareto optimum to yield a Pareto improvement.13
The Coase theorem would suggest that CD might emerge 
independently of regulation, but management opportunism, 
transaction costs and inherent limitations on capital markets 
ensures that it usually does not (or does so only partially).
The diverse systems of CD implemented in the 1970s will 
provide important information on the functioning of these systems 
over the long run. Empirical studies of their performance take on 
great importance; for example, might the investment boom in West 
Germany, underway well before the East European revolutions, be 
connected with CD? Pending such studies, a cautious program for 
countries without CD laws such as the US and Canada would be 
public funding for extension services which would publicize what 
is known about CD and provide consulting and training for firms 
wishing to initiate broader participation of employees in 
management. Moreover, in half the US states, the term "business 
opportunity" has been defined in a legal statute, and its use is 
regulated by state agency. A claim by management that a 
prospective employee will participate in relevant decisions will 
be more effective in securing firm specific investments if a 
concrete meaning of the term is legally guaranteed.
This paper has examined the market failures case for CD. The 
market may and does generate some CD, but it is likely to 
systematically "underinvest" in it, as measured by technical 
efficiency, protection of specific human capital, knowledge 




























































































workplace characteristics. A central problem is the incentive for 
managers to behave opportunistically without a viable 
responsibility mechanism. Unchecked hierarchy might be a first- 
best solution from the point of view of informational efficiency 
if not for two distinct problems: (a) managers are fallible and 
(b) managers have an incentive to behave opportunistically. 
Problems of opportunistic credit taking, lowered investment due 
to incentive incompatibility, time horizon opportunism, 
opportunism over information flows, authority-hoarding 
opportunism and costs of increased monitoring, along with the 
benefits of CD laws in solving them, were considered. CD laws 
were seen to provide incentives for employee investments in firm- 
specific human capital and ensuring an internal cooperative 
equilibrium. Reasons why the problems cannot be solved by the 
operation of either labor or capital markets were examined. 
Although legal regulations cannot be expected to solve all of the 
problems, and while codetermination has certain costs as well as 
benefits, support for CD law and some modest proposals for 
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1. This stress on efficiency is not intended to deny meaning to 
purely normative arguments, but to limit the focus of the paper.
2. Although it is striking how many insights can be gained from 
this strategy: see in particular Steinherr (1977) and Svejnar 
(1982) .
3. This suggests that simple principal-agent models are 
abstracting from something quite basic to corporate structure. 
One possibility is that the promotion-based reward system 
reflects management opportunism toward shareholders (Baker, 
Jensen and Murphy, 1988). Another is that it represents a complex 
and not yet well understood partial solution to the long-run 
risk/incentive tradeoff. Under either interpretation, it appears 
to also have the unfortunate effect of facilitating management 
opportunism toward employees.
4. Jensen and Meckling (1979) and Furubotn (1985) have implicitly 
assumed a first best world in which management is the perfect 
agent of capital when they argued that CD might have negative 
time-horizon implications by involving employees with finite 
horizons in decisions.
5. Note however that later in the monograph, Arrow qualifies the 
value of authority in economic organizations and points up a role 
for what he calls "responsibility mechanisms."
6. Thanks are due to Bob Goldfarb for suggesting this example.
7. The political science literature (e.g. Lindblom, 1965) offers 
analogous arguments about the efficiency benefits of pluralist 





























































































8. As an illustration, consider mandatory surveys of employee 
workplace preferences, with tradeoffs against wages in proportion 
to costs.
9. Here we are primarily concerned with an entrepreneur who 
probably owns some (but not all) shares of stock or stock 
options.
10. Without arguing cause and effect, it may not be a coincidence 
that the share of administrative and managerial personnel in 
total employees is 2.4% in Sweden, 3.0% in West Germany, but 
10.8% in the United States.
11. I would like to thank Ulrich Muckenberger for providing me 
with the relevant institutional background for these cases.
12. Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983) make some similar 
points, though regarding the manager-shareholder relationship.
13. Furobotn (1985, p.32) has argued that "it must be 
demonstrated that the (CD) program yields greater net advantages 
than other participatory schemes...the ratio of gains to losses 
must favor CD over all rival plans." This is too high a hurdle 
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